Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972

Michael Lowell Sparks v. Barbara Jo Ann Sparks : Appellant's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.David E. Bean; Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sparks v. Sparks, No. 12878 (1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5683

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL LOWELL SPARKS,
Plaintiff 8 Appellant,
Case No.
12878

vs.

BARBARA JO ANN SPARKS,
Defendant 8 Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Second District Court of Davis County.

HONORABLE CALVIN GOULD, Judge
DAVIDE. BEAN
190 South Fort Lane

Layton, Utah 84041
Attorney for Appellant

I

'
f

BENNETT P. PETERSEN
P. 0. Box 119
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Respondent

FILED

PRINTllR• INI:. • •UGAR HOU•S

l 1 I \I

'- I "! I :

d

.

·' ·.

..

1:"!7
)
. , I ·-

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

I

'

I

r

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE .................. 1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ................ 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ........................ 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................. 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A NATURAL MOTHER DOES NOT
HAVE A PARAMOUNT RIGHT TO
THE CUSTODY OF HER CHILDREN. 5
POINT II.
THE PAST CONDUCT AND
ONSTRATED MORAL STANDARDS
OF THE DEFENDANT DEPRIVE
HER OF AN EQUAL POSITION
WITH PLAINTIFF AS A
IAN FOR THESE CHILDREN ............... 7
POINT III.
AN ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP THAT
EITHER CAUSES OR
UTES TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE
CHILDREN IS NOT PROTECTED BY
MOTHERHOOD. -----····················-------·-····16

ii
Page

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CHANGE
THE CUSTODY OF THE TWO MINOR CHILDREN UNDER THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE. __________________________ 20
SUM MARY _____________________________________ -- ----. __________________ 21
CONCLUSION ________________________________________________________ 23

iii

CASES CITED

Page

Sampsell v. Holt,
115 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550 ( 1949) _______________ _s, IO

Weise v. Weise, 25 U.2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 __________ 5
Hyde v. Hyde, 22 U.2d 429, 45 P.2d 884 _______ _s, 6, IO
Steiger v. Steiger,
4 U.2d 273, 293 P.2d 418 ( 1956) ______________________ 6
Iv! oore v. Moore,
12 Va. 153. 183 S.E.2d 172 (I 971) __________________ 7
Kelch v. Kelch, Mo. , 462 S.W.2d 161 ( 1970) __ 7
Yager v. Yager, 159 N.W.2d 125 (S.D. 1968) ________ 7
Hans on v. Hanson,
170 N .W.2d 213 (Minn. 1969) ________________________ 7
Stuber v. Stuber,
121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 ( 1962) ------------------ 7
Sisson v. Sisson,
77 Nev. 478, 367 P.2d 98 ( 1961) ______________________ l l
Cooley v. Cooley,
86 Nev. 751, 467 P.2d I03 ( 1970) ____________________ 12
Mackey v. Mackey, 460 P.2d 371 ( 1969) ______________ 12
McNamara v. McNamara,
181 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 1970) __________________________ 14
Warren v. Warren, 191 N.W.2d 659 ___________________ J4
Pacheco v. Pacheco,
246 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1971) ________________________________ 15
Olson v. Olson, 180 N.W.2d 426 (Iowa 1970) ______ 16
Dearden v. Dearden,
15 U.2d 105. 388 P.2d 230 ( 1964) ______________ 16, 20

ST A TUTES CITED
U.C.A .. 1963, Sec. 30-3-10 ------------------------------------·· 6
U.C.A .. 1963, Sec. 30-3-5 ---------------------------------------- 6

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL LOWELL SPARKS.

Plaintiff & Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
12878

BARBARA JO ANN SPARKS,
Defendant & Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff... father petitioned the lower court for an
order changing custody of two minor children in the
custody of defendant mother under the terms of a
divorce decree.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Davis County, the Honor.able Calvin Gould. District Judge, determined that the
natural mother should retain the custody of two minor
boys, ages 6 and 3, and the natural father appeals to
the Supreme Court for a reversal of that judgment.

2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff prays that the judgment of the lower
court be reversed and that plaintiff be granted the custody of his two minor sons.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced under the
terms of a decree dated April 15, 1969. The terms of a
stipulation were made part of the decree, and among
other things provided that defendant would have the
care, custody and control of the two minor boys, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in plaintiff. Except for some harassment ( R. pages 37-39) the visitation has been constant and adequate in the usual sense
for a noncustody parent. The visitation is not adequate
to meet the needs of the children as expressed by
Nancy Schofield, nor does the visitation rig ht accord to
these young boys the security and protection they so
obviously need because of the environment and life
style imposed upon them by the attitudes and behavior
of the defendant.
The evidence is uncontradicted that defendant
loves her children, takes reasonably good care of the
children, and attempts to provide adequate care for the
children when she is at work, with the exception of the
arrangements she had with Peggy Varney when the
defendant worked nights ( R. page 118. line 11; page
115, line 3). The evidence is also uncontroverted that
within six months the defendant had three different
baby tenders and as many different boyfriends within
a year. Neal J. Harris stayed in the home overnight for
approximately one month as a "baby tender" ( R. page
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5, line 22-24), and also as a lover ( R. page 10, line 1O,
16-29) in spite of the representation otherwise in answers to interrogatories ( R. page 5, line 2-7: page 14,
line 18-22). The intimate association between the defendant and Mr. Harris continued for approximately
four months to March or April 1971.
At approximately the time that defendant and Mr.
Harris discontinued their relationship, defendant met
Larry B. Seamons ( R. page 24, line 5-8). Mr. Seamons moved into the defendant's home in May 1971.
and stayed for approximately six months. ( R. page 16,
line 27-28; page 23, line 23-25) Defendant permitted
Mr. Seamons to have a "father relationship" with the
children and represented that Mr. Seamons was her
husband ( R. page 18, line 4-9). The defendant and
Mr. Seamons intended to get married, but did not do
so even though Mr. Seamons' divorce was completed
two or three months before they separated ( R. page
18, line 28-30; page 19, line 10-15). Defendant not
only lied to plaintiff about her marriage to Mr. Seamons but at the time she and Mr. Seamons split the
blanket defendant again lied to plaintiff in an effort
to cover up her previous fabrication by telling the
plaintiff that Mr. Seamons was TDY.
Miss Nancy Schofield testified that she has a Master's Degree in Psychology and that her work has been
principally with children and retarded persons and
that she tested the six year old boy, the three year old
being too young to test accurately. She stated that in
the area of creativity and spontaneity, Lonnie, is severely lacking ( R. page 86, line 21-22 ) ; that he has
difficulty with his sexual identity and would like to be
a male but is really not sure how to go about it or what
it is, and that this is a critical time in the life of the
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child to make this determination ( R. page 87, line 1317): that he has a poor self-image and is looking for
male affection and companionship ( R. page 88, line
3-6): that the male identity problem may in fact be
secondary in importance to the overriding anxiety of
the obvious constriction in the child's feelings ( R. page
101, line 18-22); finally, that regardless of the present
visitation arrangement with the natural father it cannot override the conditions that exist the rest of the
time ( R. page 99, line 26-29).
After Mr. Seamons departed the scene John Pearl
was the next man in the life of the defendant who admitted he stayed at the home past midnight and who
has been around in the nighttime to watch TV with the
children ( R. page 22, line 27-30).
By contrast, the plaintiff is now married to Carol
Sparks who does not hesitate to discipline the two boys
when necessary but also tries to show them an abundance of love by engaging in activities with the boys
and helping them with their learning experiences. ( R.
page 57, line 13-24). The home is stable; the relationship between the boys and Carol Sparks is stable and
is no source of concern or worry to her ( R. page 64).
It is obvious from the record that the love of the plaintiff and his present wife for these two boys is genuine
and is expressed not only orally but in meaningful activities and relationships. By contrast with the defendant, the plaintiff's association with his boys is a joy
rather than a chore and a duty; his goals and activities
are family oriented to include the boys rather than individually oriented to shield the boys from some type
of association.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
A NATURAL MOTHER DOES NOT HAVE
A PARAMOUNT RIGHT TO THE CUSTODY OF HER CHILDREN.
In Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 p.2d 550
( 1949), the court enunciated some basic rules in child
custody proceedings. The court declared its own power
to review the facts as well as the law on appeal in
child custody proceedings between divorced parents
and that such proceedings are equitable and the best
interest and welfare of the minors involved is the paramount consideration. In subsequent decisions the court
has not departed from these basic concepts. Weise v.
Weise, 25 U.2d 236, 469 P.2d 504, Hyde v. Hyde, 22
U.2d 429, 454 P.2d 884.
Also, this court has determined that an award of
custody in a divorce action is not necessarily permanent. Hyde v. Hyde, Supra. Nor does a stipulation involving custody made at the time of the divorce foreclose the noncustody parent where there is a change
of circumstances. Weise v. Weise, Supra.
In Sampsell v. Holt, Supra, and subsequent cases,
the court declared that 30-3-10, UCA, did not apply
to divorce actions but only to cases of separation, and
30-3-5 was the applicable statute in divorce cases or
custody proceedings. Both of those sections were
amended by the legislature in 1969, and now read as
follows:
30-3-1 O * * * In any case of separation of
husband and wife having minor children, or
whenever a marriage is declared void or dis-
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solved, the court shall make such order for
the future care and custody of the minor children as it may deem just and proper. In determining custody, the court shall consider the
best interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of
of the parties and the natural presumption that the mother is best suited to care for
young children. The court may inquire of the
children and take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody;
however, such expressed desires shall not be
controlling and the court may, nevertheless.
determine the children's custody otherwise.
30-3-5 * * * When a decree of divorce is
made the court may make such orders in relation to the children, property and parties.
and the maintenance of the parties and children as may be equitable. The court shall
have continuing jurisdiction to make such
subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their
support and maintenance or the distribution
of the property as shall be reasonable and
necessary.
The I 0 year old age limitation to express choice
has been deleted from 30-3-5, and the provision with
respect to the choice of the children is now a part of
30-3-10. Additionally, 30-3-10 appears to set up some
guidelines on which the court shall determine custody.
regardless of the nature of the proceeding. The natural
presumption that the mother is best suited to care for
young children is only one of the three general factors
to be considered by the court.
In Hyde v. Hyde, supra, the court quoted with approval from Steiger v. Steiger, 4 U.2d 273, 293 P.2d
418 (1956) to the effect that all things being equal.
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preference will be given to the mother in awarding
custody of the children. The court then stated at page

886:

It will thus be seen that the defendant has no
absolute right to the custody of her child
simply because she is the mother. At best she
has an advantaged position when all things
are equal. However, when things are not
equal as regards the ability of the parties to
care for and properly rear the child, then any
advantage customarily given to a mother must
be denied, and the award made so as to pro...
vide for the best interest and welfare of the
child.
Thus the best that can be said for the defendant is
that her motherhood may be sufficient to tip the scales
in her favor but only after the scales are equally bal...
anced. See also Moore v. Moore, 12 Va. 153, 183
S.E.2d 172 (1971), Kelch v. Kelch, - Mo. , 462

S.W.2d 161 (1970), Yager v. Yager, 159 N.W.2d
125 (S.D. 1968) Hanson v. Hanson, 170 N.W.2d
213 (Minn.1969).
POINT II

THE PAST CONDUCT AND DEMON ...
STRATED MORAL STANDARDS OF THE
DEFENDANT DEPRIVE HER OF AN
EQUAL POSITION WITH PLAINTIFF AS
A CUSTODIAN FOR THESE CHILDREN.
Throughout the hearings in the trial court, plaintiff
was accused of character assassination toward the
defendant on the theory that Stuber v. Stuber, 121
Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 ( 1952) precludes a change of
custody on the facts herein set forth. Plaintiff has no
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desire to embarrass the defendant and fully concedes
that the life style she has chosen for herself is accepted in every state of the union regardless of penal
statutes to the contrary in some jurisdictions. Further,
plaintiff acknowledges that a woman may be a bad
wife and a good mother, and that extramarital relationships with persons of the opposite sex often considered a most serious offense against a spouse. may
not be a serious offense against the children under
some circumstances.
But the case at bar is not comparable with Stuber.
There the court found that after divorce the mother
placed the child with the father on a temporary arrangement and then the mother began living with another man who was not her husband; and she did not
request that the court return the child to her home but
rather to the home of her mother, thus insulating the
child from her life style at that time; and finally. at the
time of oral argument before this court the mother had
entered into an "advantageous marriage" with another
man. As to the child, the court found that while in the
custody of the father "he was thin, nervous, and unstable and not getting along well in school." Speaking
for the court Mr. Justice Wade said at page 652:
The fact that she lived with a man whom she
expected to marry, although censurable. does
not in itself make her an unfit and improper
person to have the custody of her child.
The only similarity in the case at bar to the Stuber case
is the life style of the defendant. and even on that com..parison this defendant seems to have established a pat..tern not shown in Stuber. In the case at bar. defendant
has not only had the children living with her during
the time she has been living with another man but in..-
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sists that this is past conduct that cannot be considered
in determining what her future conduct will be. The
answer is that "past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards" is one of the guidelines set forth in 30-3-10,
UCA annotated as amended, by which a trial court
should determine custody, and may in fact be a far
more accurate indicator of the future than anything
the defendant may say. Had plaintiff listened to the
verbal representations of defendant, he would never
have known that in fact defendant was not married to
her "husband". The testimony of defendant is recorded at page 18 of the record, beginning at line 4.

Q. Okay. Now during the time that he was in the

home, what was his relationship to the children, Mrs.
Sparks?
A. He had a father relationship with them.

Q. Did you represent to the children that he was

your husband?
A. I did.

* * *
Q. Okay. Why did you represent to Mr. Sparks

that you were married to Mr. Seamons?
A. We had planned to get married.

Q. When? When was the marriage set for?

A. He was waiting for a divorce to go through.
We planned to get married. And then I asked him to
leave, I changed my mind.
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Then when defendant's male friend left the home,
defendant again lied to plaintiff about the
stances surrounding their separation, as reflected on
page 35 of the transcript:

Q. In approximately October of 1971, did you
make any inquiry of your former wife as to where Mr.
Seamons was?
A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. And what was the reply? What did she tell
you concerning Mr. Seamons' absence from the home?
A. She said he was on TOY for Hill Field.

Q. Did the defendant ever tell you that in fact

there was no marriage to Mr. Seamons?
A. No, sir.

The life style demonstrated by defendant's
ciation with three different men in and of itself should
make her an "unfit and improper person to have
tody of her child", but in any event it certainly detracts
from her equal status with the plaintiff under the
trine of Hyde v. Hyde, supra. The fact is, that under
the doctrine of Sampsell v. Holt, supra, a father
ing custody does not have to prove that a mother
having custody is an unfit or improper person for that
custody and the quote from Mr. Justice Wade's
ion is really meaningless dicta. The real question is:
Does such conduct on the part of the mother impair
her equal status so that her motherhood is not enough
to tip the balance in her favor.
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Sission v. Sission, 77 Nev. 478, 367 P,2d 98,
( 1961 ) was a divorce action with facts substantially
similar in the behavior of the mother. She there complained that her husband ran his life the way the Navy
ran him, strictly according to the rules, and he complained that her sex life did not match the Kinsey report. On the other hand, the wife had been separated
for more than a year and had been living with another
man as husband and wife, and were so known to many
persons in their immediate community. They were each
engaged in church work and devoted substantial time
and attention to the activities of the children, including
family picnics, auto races, swimming, and other group
activities. At page 103, the court stated:
It is evident and without dispute that the fa ...
ther, under the circumstances of this case,
could have provided the children with as much
love, with more security and stability, and
with a more wholesome moral environment
than did the mother. * * * Though the
mother professed great love and affection for
them it became incidental to her passion for
another man. Adult passions, apparently,
sometimes provoke illicit togetherness. However, we cannot approve such conduct, especially its exhibition before beloved children.
This is not a case where adultery is but an
isolated occurrence. To the contrary, the wife
-mother deliberately subjected her children
to a shameful. immoral. unwholesome environment of more than a year's duration. That a
more satisfactory solution was available for
the children's welfare pending divorce, is
without question. We note that the
was not found unfit. Indeed such a findmg
was not possible under the facts here present
* * *. We have not found authority from
any court which would support a custody
award to the mother, under circumstances like
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these. The adultery with which we are here
concerned probably did not effect the husband-wife relationship, for reasons hertofore related, but it must have caused terrible
harm to the children.
There was no evidence of harm to the children,
but this did not bother the court. After separation the
husband lived in his parents' home which was found
by the court to be adequate. The Supreme Court of
Nevada was in this case called upon to assess the moral
standard of the State of Nevada and determined that
such conduct on the part of a wife-mother was below
the standard for that state. In Cooley v. Cooley, 86
Nev. 751, 467 P.2d 103, (1970), the Nevada court
was again called upon to decide the exact same issue
in a custody proceeding where the mother lived with
her paramour only one month before they got married.
The trial court's decision to grant custody to the mother was affirmed by a divided court distinguishing Sisson on the difference in time between one month and
one year affirming the principle that an admitted adultress, by that fact alone, is not an unfit mother.
However, the facts of the Cooley case do not parallel the case at bar. The time period involved here is
in excess of six months, involved at least two men, and
there has been no marriage to the men with whom she
has lived.
On somewhat similar facts the Oregon Court of
Appeals in Mackey v. Mackey, 460 P.2d 371 ( 1969),
stated at page 372, quoting the trial court:
It is my opinion that the conduct of plaintiff
with her present husband (before her marriage to him) and other men in the presence
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of the children, as established by the evidence, has rendered plaintiff unfit to continue
as the custodian of the children. I am of the
further opinion that defendant can better
meet the needs of the children and that their
welfare and future interest will best be served by awarding their custody to him.
And in conclusion the court stated:

* * * The record amply demonstrates that
the plaintiff utterly failed in the responsibility
of properly raising her two children. After the
divorce she chose to pursue a course of conduct wholly incompatible with her parental
responsibilities * * *.
There is no evidence that the plaintiff father is not
a good parent for his two sons. Indeed, the greatest
indictment against the plaintiff is that when he heard
that the defendant was leaving the children alone in
her apartment while she and her boyfriend went to
work (she had made arrangements with a neighbor
upstairs to look in on the children before the neighbor
went to bed), he became solicitous about the welfare of
his children under such circumstances. He made a
ruckus that brought the parties into juvenile court and
succeeded in getting that kind of baby tending
changed. He has attempted to maintain a close relationship to his children through consistent visitation
and has been a dutiful father under the circumstances.
In McNamara v. McNamara, 181 N.W.2d (Iowa
197 O), the trial court found that the wife had engaged
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in an adulterous relationship during the marriage and
granted custody of the children to the husband. On
review the Supreme Court stated:

* * * Furthermore, no showing is made
which reveals he has ever done anything
which would lead this or any other court to
believe the children would be raised by him
in less than a moral and proper atmosphere.
On the other hand, defendant mother's conduct has unquestionably been less than moral.
Moreover, in the course of her adulterous affair defendant exhibited a total disregard for
the children's welfare by leaving them alone
at various times and by bringing her paramour to the family home where she "entertained" him while the youngsters were present, presumably asleep.
Although immorality would not. in itself.
mean defendant is an unfit person to have
custody of her children, there is little or nothing to indicate she had so amended her ways
at the time of trial as to have preferential
custody rights.
It is thus apparent the children's best interests would not be served by placing them in
defendant's custody.
And in Warren v. Warren, 191 N.W.2d 659, the
court stated at 662:

* * * We should note that this decision is
not alone based on plaintiff's extramarital activities, both before and after the divorce.
Such moral transgressions are factors to be
considered but are not determinative. * * *
More importantly the record sho"'.'s. I?l:=iintiff
to have disregarded her respons1bd1t1e.s to
provide proper care, training. and environ-
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ment for the basic needs as well as the development of the child. Conversely, defendant and his present wife have shown
selves able and willing to provide such care
and training* * *.

Pacheco v. Pacheco, 246 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1971),

is a case that has some very striking similarities. At
page 782 the court discusses the quality of proof for
adultery, and finally concludes:
On the contrary, the evidence is convincing
that the mother has not given the boy a proper home. It appears without dispute that the
mother frequently drank intoxicating liquor
to excess and with other men and women in
the presence of the boy; that she harbored in
her home a married man under such circumstances as to indicate adulterous relations
between them extending over a considerable
period of time and that such relations were
known to her son. Such conduct on the part
of the mother in her home and to the knowledge of her son, 12 to 14 years of age, canof not be accepted by a court as the furnishing of a suitable home for a son of that age.
Reversing the trial court and granting custody to the
father, the court stated at page 502:
When the wife is proven to be morally unfit
to have the custody of the minor children of
a married couple and there is no testimony
that the father is incompetent, unfit or unworthy to have the care and custody of the
children, their care and custody should be
awarded to him if he can provide for them a
suitable home with competent and proper supervision in his absence.
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See also Olson v. Olson, 180 N.W.2d 426 (Iowa
1970).
POINT III
AN ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP THAT
EITHER CAUSES OR CONTRIBUTES
TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE CHILDREN IS NOT PROTECTED BY
MOTHERHOOD.
The rationale of Hyde, supra, is that all things
being equal, a mother is entitled to the custody of her
minor children. See also Steiger v. Steiger, supra. In
Dearden v. Dearden, 15 U.2d 105, 388 P.2d 230
(1964), the Utah Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Crockett, said at page 231 :
It is generally held that such misconduct as
found against plaintiff although, of course.
censurable and not to be condoned, will not
necessarily of itself deprive a parent of her
child. Social ideas have changed considerably
since the time of the "East Lynne" concept
when for moral transgression a wife was cast
into outer darkness and deprived of all. including her children.
However, the legislature in 1969, after the Dearden
case, has indicated that "past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties" shall
have a bearing on custody, and it seems clear that the
life style we are dealing with here (rather than isolated instances of illicit togetherness) is sufficient to
deprive the natural mother of that equality, and motherhood is not weighly enough to tip the unequally balanced scale. Further the rationale of Dearden, supra,
and Cooley, supra, is that moral misconduct alone
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should not deprive a mother of her children. But where
such conduct is the cause of or contributes to problems
affecting the normal behavior of the children, a fortiori,
such conduct will justify a change in custody.
Nancy Schofield is a qualified child psychologist
who examined Lonnie Sparks, age 6, with the consent
of the defendant and explained that Rodney Sparks,
age 3, was not old enough to test adequately. At page
86 of the record, Miss Schofield stated beginning at
line 7:
I feel that he will respond best to a low keyed
low pressure approach from adults. Lonnie
needs a lot of non-verbal signs of acceptance
rather than overt outreach. On the Stanford
Binet, I found he is bright to superior intelligence. However, his anxiety and fear often
interfere with his ability to perform.
And again at page 87 of the record, beginning at line
13:
From my experience it seems that he has some
difficulty with his.sexual identity at this point.
He would like to be a male, but he is not
really sure of what maleness is at this point.
And this is a crucial time in a child's life when
they do develop their male or female identity.
Also he seemed to be rigidly controlling his
impulses and is very frightened of showing
any of his feelings. * * * I think that it is
very important at this age for his role as a
male to be clarified and definitions of the expectations of what a man does as a person.
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And at page 88 of the record, beginning at line 3:
Once again it shows that he is looking for affection from a male. He has a poor self-image,
and he feels he has done something wrong.
There is a lot of guilt involved.
When Miss Schofield was asked to superimpose upon
her observations, the fact that Lonnie ''is residing in a
home where the male figure in the home may change"
or was not constant. in her answer at page 89 of the
record, she said:
Well, if he begins to form an attachment to
a male or female for that matter, and identified with this male, thinking that he is really
a neat guy, and he wants to be like him, and
this is the man, you know, that he is going to
make himself like. because children very definitely model after older people, and then this
person is gone and replaced by someone who
is different, and once again he tentatively
forms a relationship and starts modeling all
over again he is going to be fairly confused
and there will be no continuity in his identity
as a male or as a person. Some children form
strong attachments with teachers, you know.
and this fulfills a need when there is no father in the home. But if it is a short term and
continuous changing, I would say in any type
of situation that it would be not very stabilizing for the child and would probably confuse
his identity even more.
Under cross-examination Miss Schofield was
asked if a child in Lonnie's circumstance could overcome the male identity problem with regular visitation
from the natural father during the school and extended
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visitation of two months in the summer. In her answer
at page 99 of the record, beginning at line 26, Miss
Schofield stated:
And no matter how much time the child would
spend, you know, four days a month with the
father, that isn't going to make up for those
expectations that are occurring the rest of the
time.
And at page 100 she stated at line 13:
The person that the child is most consistently
with probably exercises a greater influence in
the long run, just from what I know.
And finally at page 101, Miss Schofield concluded at
line 19:
These are the feelings he is having. In fact
the male identity might not even be so important as the fact that Lonnie is so constricted in
his feelings. He is afraid to show his feelings.
All of the facts presented to the court concerning
the life style of the plaintiff are in sharp contrast to the
defendant. The plaintiff has remarried and has a stable
home. A child has been born to plaintiff in his second
marriage and another one is expected.
All of the evidence before the court shows that
plaintiff is better able to care for, maintain, and supply
the mental and emotional needs of these two boys than
is the defendant. He would dearly like to be a full-time
father and from the facts in evidence it would appear
that a change in custody would be in the best interest
and welfare of the boys.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CHANGE THE
CUSTODY OF THE TWO MINOR
CHILDREN UNDER THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE.
The preoccupation of this trial court, and indeed
all other trial courts, along the Wasatch Front' with
the principles enunciated in Stuber v. Stuber, supra,
and Dearden v. Dearden, supra, is extremely unfortunate. The decision in each case is geared to the facts
of the case, and the general proposition that moral
misconduct standing alone is not sufficient to deprive
a mother of her children applies essentially to misconduct outside the presence and environment of the
children. But whatever good can be said of that general rule vanishes when it is used in defense of the
illicit togetherness practiced by this defendant. Indeed,
reason is dealt a mortal blow when clean faces and
clean clothes and full bellies are the full measure of
parental responsibility. The life styles of the parties
are not comparable, nor are their homes comparable in
the love and security available to these two boys. The
well-being of the children cannot be isolated from the
life style of the parent who has custody. If the parent's
life style embraces moral misconduct in the presence
and environment of the children, who can expect more
from the children themselves? To perpetuate a general
rule of law relating to occasional moral misconduct out-
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side the presence of the children into a legal justification
for a life style based on illicit togetherness in the
presence of the children is an abandonment of the
basic structural values of our society. There is a sense
of fidelity, security, and purpose associated with marriage that have their origins in antiquity but are as
worthy of preservation for the benefit of the children
as are the constitutional principles we attempt to perpetuate. Family organization and the pride of legitimate parental and filial association do much to enhance
obedience to and respect for law, and the value of
achievement within the framework of the law. The
presence or absence of these basic attitudes, and the
life styles resulting therefrom, are often reflected in the
lives of our children as demonstrated in the life of this
six year old. To allow the rationale of Dearden to be
applied to the facts of this case constitutes the very
condonation which is there denied. This misapplication
of the rules announced in Stuber v. Stuber, supra, and
Dearden v. Dearden, supra, constitutes an abuse of
discretion and plaintiff urges that the decision of the
trial court be reversed.

SUMMARY
Most jurisdictions have accepted the general rule
that moral misconduct, standing alone, is not a sufficient ground to deprive a mother of the custody
of her children, either at the time of divorce or in
post divorce hearings. However, the general rule
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presupposes that such moral misconduct is outside the
presence of the children and under circumstances
where the children cannot be adversely affected by
such conduct. There are some cases, such as the Cooley
case in Nevada, that tolerate such moral misconduct
in the presence of the children for a short period of
time, terminating in a valid marriage relationship.
However, no recent decisions have been found by
appellant where the toleration has extended to a
month period, involving more than one man, where no
marriage was consummated, and where there is some
considerable emotional disturbance for at least one of
the children. Indeed, most of the cases follow the
reasoning expressed in Sisson regardless of any
onstrable effect on the children. It was the intent of
the legislature to make moral conduct one of the
termining factors for custody, and in this case, it is so
flagrant and detrimental to the welfare of the children
that is should create a disability for the defendant that
cannot be healed by motherhood. Appellant does not
have the burden of proving that respondent is an unfit
mother, but must only produce sufficient evidence to
support a finding that it is in the best interest and
fare of the children that custody be changed to the
natural father. There is ample evidence to support that
finding, unless defendant's motherhood weights
ier in the balance than defendant's conduct. If the
people of this state, speaking through their legislature,
desire to place limits on the unbridled application of
the general principles announced in Stuber and
den, the opportunity to set some limits is now at hand.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court should be reversed and custody of
the two minor boys should be awarded to the appellant and the case should be remanded to the District
Court of Davis County for further hearing to determine adequate visitation for the respondent and such
other matters as may effect the support and well-being
of the children.
Respecfully submitted,
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David E. Bean
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